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Abstract
An election over a finite set of candidates is called
single-crossing if, as we sweep through the list of
voters from left to right, the relative order of ev-
ery pair of candidates changes at most once. Such
elections havemany attractive properties: e.g., their
majority relation is transitive and they admit effi-
cient algorithms for problems that are NP-hard in
general. If a given election is not single-crossing,
it is important to understand what are the obstacles
that prevent it from having this property. In this pa-
per, we propose a mapping between elections and
graphs that provides us with a convenient encod-
ing of such obstacles. This mapping enables us to
use the toolbox of graph theory in order to analyze
the complexity of detecting nearly single-crossing
elections, i.e., elections that can be made single-
crossing by a small number of modifications.
1 Introduction
As the deadline for Brexit approaches, the British newspapers
clarify their positions on what they consider to be the best
course of action1. The three possibilities currently under con-
sideration are (1) accepting Theresa May’s deal with the EU
(D), (2) leaving the EU with no deal (N), and (3) postponing
Brexit or canceling it altogether (R). Among the major news-
papers, the most pro-Leave position is taken by The Daily
Telegraph, which is strongly critical of May’s deal, and ranks
it below no deal; it is also strongly opposed to any delays, so
its ranking can be described as N > D > R. On the opposite
end of the spectrum is The Guardian, which backs remaining
in the EU, but views May’s deal as (scarcely) more accept-
able than no deal at all, so its ranking is R > D > N. The
Times and The Sun take a more moderate position: both back
May’s deal, but The Times views no deal as the most catas-
trophic option, while The Sun is firmly opposed to any delays
to Brexit. Thus, if we order the newspapers according to their
political stance, from left to right, the rankings change from
R > D > N to D > R > N to D > N > R to N > D > R.
These preferences have the property that for any two of the
available alternatives X , Y if the first newspaper in our or-
1
https://bit.ly/2txNgpn
der ranks X over Y then all newspapers that rank X over Y
appear before all newspapers that rank Y over X , i.e., every
pair of alternatives ‘crosses’ at most once. An ordered list
of rankings (an election) that has this property is known as
single-crossing (see Section 2 for formal definitions). Single-
crossing elections have many attractive properties and have
recently received a lot of attention in computational social
choice literature; see, e.g., the survey by Elkind et al. [2017].
Besides the example in the previous paragraph, there are real-
life settings where we expect to observe essentially single-
crossing preferences. For instance, when a country is about
to introduce a flat tax rate and the voters are asked to rank sev-
eral options (say, 25%, 28%, 33%, 45%), they have to con-
sider the tradeoff between the amount they will have to pay
and the value of the government services that can be provided
at a given level of taxation; if all voters apply this reasoning,
the election where the voters are ordered by income should be
single-crossing (this example dates back to Mirrlees [1971].
However, the examples we described, while single-
crossing in spirit, may not be single-crossing in a formal
sense, because the single-crossing property is very fragile.
For instance, in the Brexit scenario, if we expand the list of
newspapers to include a broader sample of publications, we
may find left-leaning newspapers that support no deal. In the
tax scenario, not all voters may be capable of evaluating the
consequences of each choice.
Now, we can easily check whether an election where voters
are ordered according to a publicly observable parameter is
single-crossing, simply by looking at all pairs of candidates.
However, as argued above, we expect the answer to be ‘no’.
A more important—and more challenging!—task is to under-
stand whether this election is close to single-crossing, i.e.,
can be made single-crossing by deleting a few voters or can-
didates or swapping a few pairs of candidates, as this will tell
us whether the observable parameter used to order the voters
is relevant for understanding the voters’ preferences. This
knowledge is important, e.g., for managing electoral cam-
paigns, as it can be used to identify the segments of voting
population that are more likely to support a given candidate
(which can help the campaign managers to decide whom to
target in a get-out-the-vote effort).
Our Contribution
We introduce a mapping between elections and graphs that
enables us to use powerful graph-theoretic machinery to an-
alyze nearly single-crossing elections. Briefly, given an elec-
tion E over a set of candidates C (i.e., an ordered list of lin-
ear orders over C), we build an undirected graph G that has
C as its set of vertices, and contains an edge between two
candidates a and b if and only if a and b cross more than
once in E; we say that E implements G. In other words,
the graph G documents obstacles that prevent E from being
single-crossing; in particular, an independent set in G corre-
sponds to a subset of candidates such that the restriction of E
to this subset is single-crossing. We then ask which graphs are
n-implementable, i.e., can be implemented by elections with
n voters. We show (Section 5) that we can obtain any undi-
rected graph in this manner; in fact, the number of voters re-
quired is bounded by a linear function in the size of the graph.
However, for any constant n there are graphs that are not n-
implementable. In Section 4 we focus on 3-implementable
graphs and obtain a complete characterization of this class of
graphs by relating it to the class of permutation graphs. We
also argue that all 3-implementable graphs are comparability
graphs; importantly, every comparability graph is a perfect
graph.
Our results have implications for the problem of deciding
whether an election is nearly single-crossing with respect to
the given order of voters (Section 6). In particular, we use our
mapping to establish the hardness of computing two measures
of how close a given election is to being single-crossing: one
of these measures is based on deleting as few candidates as
possible, and the other is based on splitting the candidates into
as few groups as possible. On the other hand, our results for
3-implementable graphs enable us to show that the problems
we consider are in P for elections with 3 voters.
Related Work
The concept of single-crossing elections has been pro-
posed in the social choice literature several decades
ago [Mirrlees, 1971; Roberts, 1977]. Single-crossing elec-
tions are appealing both from a purely social choice-theoretic
perspective and from a computational perspective: for
instance, their weak majority relation is necessarily transitive
[Mirrlees, 1971] and they admit efficient algorithms for
determining a winning committee under a well-known
committee selection rule whose output is hard to compute
for general preferences [Skowron et al., 2015]. Several
groups of authors have considered the problem of identifying
nearly single-crossing elections [Bredereck et al., 2016;
Cornaz et al., 2013; Elkind and Lackner, 2014;
Jaeckle et al., 2018], but in all these papers the authors
assumed that there was no publicly observable parameter that
determined the ordering of the voters, i.e., they considered
the problem of reordering the voters so that the resulting
election can be made single-crossing by applying a small
number of modifications; in contrast, we assume that the
order of voters is fixed.
Our analysis is similar in spirit to the research on imple-
mentation of directed graphs as majority graphs. In this line
of work, the input is a directed graph with a vertex set C, and
the goal is to construct an election E over the set of can-
didates C such that there is a directed edge from a ∈ C
to b ∈ C in the input graph if and only if a strict majority
of voters in E prefer a to b. The classic McGarvey theo-
rem [McGarvey, 1953] establishes that every directed graph
can be implemented in this way using at most two voters
per edge, and subsequent work has reduced this number
to Θ( |C|
log |C|) [Stearns, 1959; Erdos and Moser, 1964]; Corol-
lary 9 in Section 5 can be viewed as an analogue of Mc-
Garvey’s theorem in our setting. Recently, Bachmeier et al.
[2017] investigated what directed graphs can be implemented
by elections with two or three voters; this research is similar
to our analysis in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
For each s ∈ N, we denote the set {1, . . . , s} by [s].
Elections An election is a pair (C, V ), where C is a finite
set of candidates and V = (v1, . . . , vn) is a list of votes.
Each vote vi, i ∈ [n], is a linear order over C. We refer to
elements of [n] as voters; thus, vi is the vote of voter i. We
will sometimes use the term ‘profile’ to refer to V , and we use
the terms ‘vote’, ‘preference’ and ‘ranking’ interchangeably.
We say that voter i prefers a to b or ranks a over b (and write
a ≻i b) if a precedes b in the linear order vi. A restriction of
an election E = (C, V ) with V = (v1, . . . , vn) to a subset
of candidatesX ⊆ C is an election E|X = (X,V
X), where
V X = (vX1 , . . . , v
X
n ) and for every pair of candidates a, b ∈
X and every i ∈ [n] it holds that a is ranked above b in vXi if
and only if a is ranked above b in vi.
Single-crossing (also known as intermediate or order-
restricted) preferences capture settings where the voters can
be ordered along a single axis according to their preferences.
Definition 1. An electionE = (C, V ) with V = (v1, . . . , vn)
is single-crossing if for every pair of candidates {a, b} with
a ≻1 b there is a t ∈ [n] such that {i ∈ [n] | a ≻i b} = [t].
We emphasize that we define single-crossing elections with
respect to a fixed order of the voters, i.e., we are interested
in settings where voters are ordered according to a publicly
observable parameter.
Graphs An undirected graph is a pair G = (V , E), where
V is a finite set, and E is a collection of size-2 subsets of V .
The elements of V are called vertices, and the elements of E
are called edges. For readability, we will sometimes write ab
instead of {a, b}. We assume that the reader is familiar with
the definitions of a path, a cycle, a tree, and a bipartite graph.
A hole is a cycle a1, . . . , ak with k ≥ 4 such that aiaj ∈ E if
and only if |i − j| = 1 or {i, j} = {1, k}. An anti-hole is a
sequence of distinct vertices a1, . . . , ak with k ≥ 4 such that
aiaj 6∈ E if and only if |i− j| = 1 or {i, j} = {1, k}.
A directed graph is a pair G = (V ,A), where V is a finite
set, and A is a collection of ordered pairs of elements of V .
An element of A is called an arc; an arc (a, b) points from
vertex a to vertex b. An undirected graph (V , E) can be turned
into a directed graph (V , E) by choosing an orientation for
each edge {a, b} ∈ E , i.e., transforming {a, b} into (a, b) or
(b, a). A directed graphG = (V ,A) is said to be transitive if
for every triple of vertices u, v, w ∈ V such that (u, v) ∈ A
and (v, w) ∈ A it holds that (u,w) ∈ A.
3 Single-Crossing Implementation
A pair of candidates {a, b} is a multi-crossing pair in an elec-
tion E = (C, V ) with V = (v1, . . . , vn) if a ≻i b, b ≻j a,
and a ≻k b for some i, j, k ∈ [n] with i < j < k.
Definition 2. The multi-crossing graph of an election E =
(C, V ) is an undirected graph γ(E) = (V , E) such that
V = C and ab ∈ E if and only if {a, b} is a multi-crossing
pair inE. An electionE = (C, V ) implements an undirected
graph G = (V , E) if G = γ(E). We say that a graph G is
n-implementable if there exists an n-voter election that im-
plements it. Since the set of candidates in an election (C, V )
that implements a graph G = (V , E) is necessarily V , we of-
ten omit C from the notation and speak of a profile V that
implements G.
By definition, the only graph that is 2-implementable is the
graph with no edges. Thus, in the remainder of the paper we
study graphs that are n-implementable for n ≥ 3.
4 3-Implementability
To build the reader’s intuition, we first consider 3-
implementation. We show how to implement several families
of graphs, such as paths, trees and even-length cycles. While
for some of these families their 3-implementability follows
from the more general results in Section 4.2, the proofs below
provide efficient algorithms for finding a 3-voter profile that
implements a given graph. Also, we relate 3-implementable
graphs to other well-known classes of graphs, such as per-
mutation graphs and comparability graphs. Finally, we prove
that some graphs are not 3-implementable.
4.1 Examples
First, it is easy to see that we can 3-implement empty graphs
and cliques: an empty graph is implemented by a profile
where all three voters are identical, and a clique can be imple-
mented by a profile where the first and the third voter rank the
candidates in the same order, and the second voter ranks the
candidates in the opposite order. A somewhat more complex
construction establishes that all paths and even-length cycles
are 3-implementable.
Proposition 1. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that
given a graph P = (V , E) that is a path or an even-length
cycle constructs a 3-voter profile that implements P .
Proof. Suppose that P is a path. For convenience, we assume
that V = [s] and E = {{i, i+ 1} | i ∈ [s − 1]}. To start, we
construct a 3-voter profile where all voters rank the candi-
dates as 1 ≻ 2 ≻ · · · ≻ s. Then, we modify the preferences
of the first and the third voter by swapping candidates 2i and
2i+1 in her rankings, for i = 1, . . . , ⌊ s−1
2
⌋. Also, we modify
the preferences of the second voter by swapping candidates 2i
and 2i − 1 in her ranking, for i = 1, . . . , ⌊ s
2
⌋. Table 1 (left)
illustrates the resulting profiles for s = 6. To see why this
profile implements a path, consider an even-numbered candi-
date 2i, 2i < s. By construction, all voters rank 2i above all
candidates j with j < 2i− 1 and below all candidates k with
k > 2i + 1. On the other hand, voters 1 and 3 rank 2i below
2i+1 and above 2i−1, whereas voter 2 ranks 2i above 2i−1
v1 v2 v3
1 2 1
3 1 3
2 4 2
5 3 5
4 6 4
6 5 6
v1 v2 v3
1 2 3
3 4 5
2 3 4
5 6 1
4 5 2
6 1 6
Table 1: 3-implementations of path and cycle of length 6.
and below 2i+1. Thus, {2i, j} is a multi-crossing pair if and
only if j ∈ {2i − 1, 2i + 1}. For odd-numbered candidates
2i+ 1 with 2i+ 1 < s, as well as for candidates 1 and s, the
argument is similar.
A similar approach can be used if P is an even-length
cycle; we omit the proof, but provide an example in Ta-
ble 1(right).
The reader may wonder why we only consider cycles of
even length in Proposition 1. Now, the cycle of length 3 is 3-
implementable because it is a clique. However, for k ≥ 2 the
cycle of length 2k + 1 is not 3-implementable; this follows
from Theorem 5 in Section 4.2.
On the other hand, we can extend the result of Proposition 1
to arbitrary trees.
Proposition 2. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that
given a graph T = (V , E) that is a tree constructs a 3-voter
profile that implements T .
Proof. Given a tree T = (V , E), we pick an arbitrary ver-
tex r0 ∈ V to be its root. Our implementation is recur-
sive. We observe that an isolated vertex is trivially imple-
mentable. Then we consider a vertex r of T whose chil-
dren are r1, . . . , rk, k ≥ 1. We show that, if for each
i ∈ [k] we have a 3-implementation of the tree rooted at ri
in which the first voter ranks ri first, then we can construct
a 3-implementation of the tree rooted at r in which the first
voter ranks r first. Using this idea, we can construct an im-
plementation of T starting from the leaves and ending at r0.
Fix a vertex r ∈ V that is not a leaf. Let r1, . . . , rk be the
children of r, and for each i ∈ [k] let Ti be the subtree of T
rooted at ri; let Vi be the set of vertices of Ti. Suppose that
for each i ∈ [k] we have a 3-implementation of Ti in which
ri is ranked first in the first vote.
We will first stack these three implementations on top of
each other: we construct a 3-voter profile where each voter
ranks all candidates in Vi above all candidates in Vj for all
1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, and for each t ∈ {1, 2, 3} and each i ∈ [k]
the t-th voter ranks a ∈ Vi above b ∈ Vi if and only if the
t-th voter in the given 3-implementation of Ti ranks a above
b. Then we pull the candidates r1, . . . , rk to the top of the
first vote: we modify the preferences of voter 1 so that she
ranks ri in position i for i ∈ [k] and the relative order of the
other candidates remains unchanged. Note that this step does
not introduce any multi-crossing pairs.
In remains to insert r into the voters’ rankings. To this
end, in the first vote we insert r after the first k candidates, in
the second vote we place r on top, and in the third vote we
place r last. Note that for each i ∈ [k] the pair {r, ri} is multi-
crossing, but for every i ∈ [k] and every a ∈ Vi \{ri} the pair
{r, a} is not multi-crossing, as both of the first two voters rank
r above a. Thus, we have implemented the edges connecting
r to its children. However, in the resulting profile voter 1 does
not rank r first. To remedy this, we first reverse the order of
candidates in each vote and then reverse the order of votes;
neither of these operations changes the set of multi-crossing
pairs, and in the resulting profile r is ranked first. Each of
these steps can be implemented in polynomial time.
4.2 General Constructions
We can relate 3-implementable graphs to two well-known
classes of graphs: permutation graphs and comparability
graphs.
Definition 3 (Permutation graph). An undirected graphG =
(V , E) is a permutation graph if there exist permutations
π1, π2 of V such that ab ∈ E if and only if a appears before b
in exactly one of the permutations π1 and π2.
It can be decided in polynomial time whether a given graph
is a permutation graph; moreover, if the answer is ‘yes’,
the respective permutations can be constructed in polynomial
time as well [Golumbic, 1980; Simon and Trunz, 1994].
It is immediate that every permutation graph can be imple-
mented by a 3-voter profile.
Theorem 3. Every permutation graph is 3-implementable,
and a 3-voter profile that implements it can be computed in
polynomial time.
Proof. Let G be a permutation graph, and let π1 and π2
be two permutations that witness this. Then the profile
(π1, π2, π1) implementsG.
In fact, the proof of Theorem 3 suggests a stronger claim:
an undirected graph is a permutation graph if and only if it
can be implemented by a 3-voter profile where the first and
the third voter have the same preferences. Recall that our
implementation of cliques has this property, but our imple-
mentation of even-length cycles does not. There is a reason
for this: it is not hard to show that cycles of length at least 5
are not permutation graphs. Thus, permutation graphs form
a proper subclass of 3-implementable graphs. The follow-
ing proposition further clarifies the relationship between 3-
implementable graphs and permutation graphs.
Proposition 4. A graph G = (V , E) is 3-implementable if
and only if there exist two permutation graphs (V , E1) and
(V , E2) such that E = E1 ∩ E2.
Proof. Let (V , E1) and (V , E2) be two permutation graphs on
the same set of vertices V . Let π1, π2 (respectively, π3, π4) be
a pair of permutations witnessing that (V , E1) (respectively,
(V , E2)) is a permutation graph. Note that if a pair of per-
mutations π, π̂ witnesses that a given graph is a permutation
graph, then so does the pair of permutations σ ◦ π, σ ◦ π̂, for
any given permutation σ. Applying this observation to π3, π4
with σ = π2 ◦ π
−1
3 , we can assume that π3 = π2. Then the
profile (v1, v2, v4) where for each i ∈ {1, 2, 4} voter i ranks
the candidates according to πi implements (V , E
1 ∩ E2): a
pair of candidates {a, b} is multi-crossing in this profile if
and only if both π1 and π4 disagree with π2 = π3 on the
order of a and b.
Conversely, let (v1, v2, v3) be a 3-implementation of a
graph G = (V , E). Consider the graphs (V , E1) and (V , E2)
implemented, respectively, by (v1, v2, v1) and (v2, v3, v2).
As argued in the proof of Theorem 3, both of these graphs are
permutation graphs, and a pair of candidates {a, b} is multi-
crossing in (v1, v2, v3) if and only if ab ∈ E
1 and ab ∈ E2.
This completes the proof.
Another relevant class of graphs is comparability graphs.
Definition 4 (Comparability graph). A graph G = (V , E) is
a comparability graph if edges in E can be oriented so that
the resulting directed graph (V ,A) is transitive.
Comparability graphs can be recognized in polynomial
time, and the respective edge orientation can be computed
efficiently [Golumbic, 1980; Simon and Trunz, 1994].
Theorem 5. Every 3-implementable graph is a comparability
graph.
Proof. Consider a graph G = (V , E) implemented by a pro-
file (v1, v2, v3). We orient the edge {a, b} from a to b if
a ≻1 b and from b to a otherwise. Since {a, b} is a multi-
crossing pair, a ≻1 b implies b ≻2 a, a ≻3 b. Consider a pair
of arcs (a, b), (b, c) in the resulting directed graph. We have
a ≻1 b, b ≻1 c and hence a ≻1 c. Similarly, b ≻2 a, c ≻2 b
implies c ≻2 a and a ≻3 b, b ≻3 c implies a ≻3 c. Thus, our
directed graph also contains the arc (a, c).
Comparability graphs are known to be perfect graphs
[Mirsky, 1971], i.e., graphs that contain neither odd-length
holes nor odd-length anti-holes2. Hence, Theorem 5 explains
why Proposition 1 does not extend to odd cycles: by defini-
tion, odd cycles are not perfect graphs. Also, it subsumes the
existence results of Propositions 1 and 2: paths, even-length
cycles, and trees can be easily seen to be comparability graphs
(we note, however, that these propositions also provide effi-
cient algorithms to compute the respective 3-voter profiles,
and it is not clear how to extract such algorithms from the
proof of Theorem 5). In particular, every bipartite graph is a
comparability graph (we can direct the edges from one part to
the other), and paths, even-length cycles and trees are bipar-
tite graphs. However, there exists a bipartite graph that is not
3-implementable (and hence 3-implementable graphs form a
proper subclass of comparability graphs).
Proposition 6. The bipartite 3-regular graph with parts of
size 4 each (see Figure 1) is not 3-implementable.
5 n-Implementation for n > 3
We have seen that not all graphs are 3-implementable. How-
ever, we will now show that every graph G = (V , E) is im-
plementable by an election whose number of voters is linear
2Originally, perfect graphs are defined as graphs with the prop-
erty that the chromatic number of every induced subgraph is equal
to the size of the maximum clique in that subgraph [Berge, 1961];
however, by the strong Berge conjecture, which was proved by
Chudnovsky et al. [2006], perfect graphs are exactly the graphs with
no odd-length holes and no odd-length antiholes.
ab
c
d
1
2
3
4
Figure 1: A bipartite graph that is not 3-implementable.
in min{|V|, |E|}. We first define a class of single-crossing
elections that can be used to implement an arbitrary graph.
Definition 5. A single-crossing election E = (C, V ) with
V = (v1, . . . , vn) is fully single-crossing if for every pair of
candidates a, b ∈ C with a ≻1 b there is an i ∈ [n− 1] such
that a ≻i b, b ≻i+1 a, and voter i+ 1 ranks b just above a.
Note that in a fully single-crossing election the ranking of
the last voter is the inverse of the ranking of the first voter,
i.e., every pair of candidates ‘crosses’ exactly once.
Theorem 7. If there exists a fully single-crossing election
(C, V ) with |C| = m, |V | = n then every m-vertex graph
is (2n− 1)-implementable.
Proof. Consider a fully single-crossing election E = (C, V )
with |C| = m, V = (v1, . . . , vn), and let G = (V , E) be an
m-vertex graph. Let V̂ = (v1, v2, v2, . . . , vn, vn). By con-
struction, the election Ê = (C, V̂ ) is single-crossing. Now,
for each edge ab ∈ E we identify an i ∈ [n−1] such that in E
we have a ≻i b, b ≻i+1 a, and voter i + 1 ranks b just above
a. We then swap a and b in the preferences of the (2i+ 1)-st
voter in V̂ (who, like voter i+1 in the original election, ranks
b just above a prior to the swap). This ensures that {a, b} is
a multi-crossing pair in the resulting election. In the end we
obtain an election that implements G.
A fully single-crossing election with m candidates and(
m
2
)
+1 voters can be obtained as a maximal chain in a weak
Bruhat order; in this election, which we will denote by EB ,
each vote differs from its predecessor by exactly one swap of
adjacent candidates (see [Bredereck et al., 2013] and the ref-
erences therein). One can useEB as a starting point to imple-
ment an arbitrary graph G = (V , E) with 2|E| + 1 votes: we
takeEB , remove each vote that is obtained from its predeces-
sor by swapping a pair of candidates that does not correspond
to an edge in the input graph, and then use the construction
in the proof of Theorem 7. However, for dense graphs this
produces an implementation with Θ(|V|2) voters.
In contrast, our next theorem, in conjunction with Theo-
rem 7, shows that every graph G = (V , E) is (2|V| + 1)-
implementable. Our construction is inspired by the concept of
odd-even sort [Lakshmivarahan et al., 1984] and, to the best
of our knowledge, is new.
Theorem 8. For every m ≥ 2 there exists a fully single-
crossing election withm candidates andm+ 1 voters.
Proof. Let C = {1, . . . ,m}. Consider the following se-
quence ofm+ 1 votes. The first vote is given by 1 ≻1 2 ≻1
· · · ≻1 m. Then, for each ℓ = 1, . . . , ⌈m/2⌉, the vote 2ℓ
is obtained from the vote 2ℓ − 1 by swapping the candidates
in positions 2i and 2i − 1 for i = 1, . . . , ⌊m/2⌋. Similarly,
for each ℓ = 1, . . . , ⌊m/2⌋, the vote 2ℓ + 1 is obtained from
the vote 2ℓ by swapping candidates in positions 2i and 2i+1
for i = 1, . . . , ⌈m/2⌉ − 1. The resulting profile for m = 7
is given in Table 2. We will now argue that this procedure
produces a fully single-crossing profile.
1 2 2 4 4 6 6 7
2 1 4 2 6 4 7 6
3 4 1 6 2 7 4 5
4 3 6 1 7 2 5 4
5 6 3 7 1 5 2 3
6 5 7 3 5 1 3 2
7 7 5 5 3 3 1 1
Table 2: A fully single-crossing election form = 7.
First, we show that in vm+1 the candidates are ranked as
m ≻m+1 m − 1 ≻m+1 · · · ≻m+1 1. Indeed, suppose that
a is even. Then, by construction, for i = 2, . . . , a, in the
i-th vote a is ranked in position a − i + 1. Then, in vote
va+1 candidate a remains ranked in position 1, and in the
remaining m − a votes a moves down step by step, ending
up in position m + 1 − a. Conversely, if a is odd, it moves
down step by step in the firstm+1−a votes, stays in the last
position for one more step, and then starts climbing back up,
ending in positionm+ 1− a. This implies our claim.
We have shown that each pair of candidates is swapped at
least once. To see that it is swapped exactly once, we compute
the total number of swaps. If m is even, then every even-
numbered vote differs from its predecessor by m
2
swaps and
every odd-numberedvote apart from the first vote differs from
its predecessor by m
2
− 1 swaps. Thus, the total number of
swaps is
(
m
2
)
, and hence each pair of candidates is swapped
exactly once. For odd values ofm the calculation is similar.
It remains to note that, by construction, if a ≻i b, but
b ≻i+1 a, then b is ranked just above a in vi+1, as we only
swap adjacent candidates. This completes the proof.
Combining Theorem 8 and Theorem 7, we obtain the fol-
lowing corollary.
Corollary 9. An undirected graphG = (V , E) is (2|V|+ 1)-
implementable.
The bound in Corollary 9 is linear in |V|. One can ask if
we implement each graph using a constant number of votes.
It turns out that the answer is ‘no’.
To show this, we use the Erdo¨s–Szekeres theorem
[Erdo¨s and Szekeres, 1935] to argue that if a graph is imple-
mentable by an election with a few voters then it has to have
a large clique or a large independent set.
Lemma 10. If an s-vertex graph is n-implementable then it
has a clique or size at least s1/2
n−1
or an independent set of
size at least s1/2
n−1
.
On the other hand, we have the following well-known fact,
which can be easily proved by the probabilistic method (see,
e.g., [Bolloba´s and Erdo¨s, 1976]).
Lemma 11. There exists an integer constant α > 0 such that
for every positive integer s there exists a graph G = (V , E)
with |V| = s vertices with the property that each clique and
each independent set in G have at most α log s vertices.
Together, Lemmas 10 and 11 imply that for every n ≥ 0
there are graphs that are not n-implementable; in fact, our
proof shows that for each n there is a graph of size at most
22
2n
with this property.
Theorem 12. For every positive integern there exists a graph
G = (V , E) with |V| ≤ 22
2n
that is not n-implementable.
6 Applications
We will now apply the tools developed in Sections 4 and 5
to the problem of detecting elections that are close to being
single-crossing with respect to a given order of voters, for two
measures of closeness.
Definition 6. An instance of CANDIDATE DELETION is given
by an election E = (C, V ) and an integer k ≥ 1. It is a yes-
instance if and only if there is a subset X ⊆ C with |X | ≥
|C| − k such that E|X is single-crossing. An instance of k-
CANDIDATE PARTITION is given by an electionE = (C, V ).
It is a yes-instance if and only if C can be partitioned into k
sets C1, . . . , Ck so that for each j ∈ [k] the election E|Cj is
single-crossing.
We will now show that both of these problems are hard, by
leveraging our observation that E|X is single-crossing if and
only if X is an independent set in γ(E).
Theorem 13. CANDIDATE DELETION is NP-complete; k-
CANDIDATE PARTITION is NP-complete for every k ≥ 3.
Proof. It is immediate that both of these problems are in NP.
To show that CANDIDATE DELETION is NP-hard, we reduce
from INDEPENDENT SET. An instance of INDEPENDENT
SET is given by a graph G = (V , E) and an integer t; it is
a yes-instance if G has an independent set of size at least
t and a no-instance otherwise. This problem is well-known
to be NP-hard [Garey and Johnson, 1979]. Given an instance
〈G, t〉 of the INDEPENDENT SET problem, we build an elec-
tion E = (C, V ) that implements it using the construction
described in Section 5; the size of the resulting election is
polynomial in the size of G, and G has an independent set of
size at least t if and only if 〈E, t〉 is a yes-instance of CAN-
DIDATE DELETION.
We use the same argument for k-CANDIDATE PARTITION;
the only difference is that we reduce from the k-COLORING
problem. An instance of k-COLORING is given by a graph
G = (V , E); it is a yes-instance if there exists a mapping
χ : V → {1, . . . , k} such that χ(a) 6= χ(b) for every
{a, b} ∈ E and a no-instance otherwise. Note that each
‘color’ χ−1(i), i ∈ [k], forms an independent set in G. The
k-COLORING problem is well-known to be NP-hard for ev-
ery k ≥ 3 [Garey and Johnson, 1979]. Again, given a graph
G, we construct an election E that implements it, and ob-
serve that G is k-colorable if and only if E is a yes-instance
of k-CANDIDATE PARTITION.
On the other hand, we can use the results in Section 4 to
show that CANDIDATE DELETION and k-CANDIDATE PAR-
TITION are in P for elections with at most 3 voters.
Theorem 14. Given an election E = (C, V ) with at most
three voters and an integer k, we can decide in polynomial
time whether the pair 〈E, k〉 is a yes-instance of CANDIDATE
DELETION. Also, for each k ≥ 1 we can decide in polyno-
mial time whether 〈E, k〉 is a yes-instance of k-CANDIDATE
PARTITION.
Proof. Given an election E = (C, V ) with at most three vot-
ers, we construct its multi-crossing graph γ(E). By Theo-
rem 5 the graph γ(E) is a comparability graph and hence a
perfect graph. As argued in the proof of Theorem 13, to de-
cide whether 〈E, k〉 is a yes-instance of CANDIDATE DELE-
TION, it suffices to determine whether 〈γ(E), |C| − k〉 is a
yes-instance of INDEPENDENT SET, and to decide whether
〈E, k〉 is a yes-instance of k-CANDIDATE PARTITION, it suf-
fices to determine whether 〈γ(E), k〉 is a yes-instance of k-
COLORING. It remains to note that both INDEPENDENT SET
and k-COLORING are known to be polynomial-time solvable
on perfect graphs (see, e.g., Diestel [2012]).
By a similar argument, 2-CANDIDATE PARTITION is
polynomial-time solvable for any number of voters.
Proposition 15. 2-CANDIDATE PARTITION is polynomial-
time solvable.
Proof. An election E is a yes-instance of 2-CANDIDATE
PARTITION if and only if the graph γ(E) is 2-colorable, and
2-colorability can be checked in polynomial time.
7 Conclusions
We have introduced the notion of single-crossing implemen-
tation of a graph and showed how to exploit the connection
between elections and graphs to better understand the com-
plexity of detecting elections that are nearly single-crossing
with respect to a fixed order of voters. Our approach turned
out to be useful for two distance measures: the number of
candidates that need to be deleted to make the input election
single-crossing, and the number of parts that the candidate set
needs to be split into so that the projection of the input elec-
tion onto each set is single-crossing. There are other distance
measures that can be used in this context: e.g., we can remove
or partition voters, or swap adjacent candidates in voters’
preferences. In a companion paper [Lakhani et al., 2019], we
explore the complexity of computing how far a given elec-
tion is from being single-crossing according to several other
distance measures.
Our work suggests several interesting open questions.
First, it is not known what is the smallest value of n such
that everym-vertex graph is n-implementable: there is a sig-
nificant gap between the upper bound of Corollary 9 and the
lower bound of Theorem 12. Second, our characterization
of 3-implementable graphs does not suggest an efficient al-
gorithm for checking whether a graph is 3-implementable.
More broadly, we do not know if one can efficiently com-
pute the smallest profile that implements a given graph; we
conjecture that this problem is NP-complete.
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